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Disrespecting the
“Opinions of Mankind”
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Eugene Kontorovich

I

N ROPER V. SIMMONS, the Supreme international law is binding on U.S. courts
Court, after rehearsing the international in constitutional cases. Rather, the Court
and foreign condemnation of the death says “the opinion of the world community”
penalty for 6 and 7 year olds, held that can provide “conﬁrmation for our own consuch punishment also violates the Eighth clusions.”² This is an extraordinarily honAmendment.¹ In recent years, international est admission that the Court will only cite
law has made brief appearances in Atkins international opinion when it supports the
and Lawrence, but only as part of the cho- result the justices wish to reach for other
rus. In Roper, it got star billing – an en- reasons; if “the opinion of the world comtire roman numeral of the Court’s opinion munity” contradicts that of the majority, it
(roughly 20% of the total pages) is devoted won’t ﬁnd its way into the Opinion of the
to considering international instruments Court.³
Still, Roper’s extended discussion of
and practices. Thus Roper represents a signiﬁcant victory for the view that American “the opinion of the world community” in a
courts should look abroad when interpret- constitutional case deserves closer attening the U.S. Constitution (a position which tion. This Article will consider a particuwill be referred to here to as “international- lar argument that has often been advanced
ist”). The signiﬁcance of this victory is un- for the internationalist approach, one that
certain because Roper does not suggest that is reﬂected in the Roper opinion itself. The
Eugene Kontorovich is an assistant professor at the George Mason University School of Law.
 544 U.S. __, 25 S. Ct. 83 (2005).
2 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
3 Justice Scalia notes that the Court ignores other countries’ laws when it comes to the establishment
of religion or abortion rights. See id. at 227 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But he has not caught the Court
in a contradiction, because Justice Kennedy’s opinion admits that it uses international materials opportunistically.
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phrase “opinion of the world community” is that the use of foreign law is as American
a politically-correct update of the “opinions as apple pie, especially on such “opinionated”
of mankind” to which the Declaration of issues as the morality of capital punishment.
Independence said “decent respect” should In this view, Roper is not a departure, but
be paid.⁴ The similarity in language is not rather a traditionalist return to the princifortuitous. Justice Ginsburg, speaking just ples of the founding.
one month after Roper, said the decision
Indeed, the Declaration’s solicitude for
represents, “perhaps the fullest expression[] the “opinions of mankind” has become a
to date on the propriety and utility of look- staple of the internationalist argument. The
ing to ‘the opinions of [human]kind.’”⁵ In phrase has been invoked by the nation’s
recent years, the Declaration’s preamble has most respected and inﬂuential international
been frequently cited by champions of the law scholars.⁶ The importance the internainternationalist approach as evidence that tionalist view places on the preambulatory
American law should look to and incorpo- passage can be inferred from the very titles
rate foreign values. Because Thomas Jeﬀer- of some articles.⁷ Moreover, the impact of
son, the author of the Declaration, insisted the argument extends far beyond the acadon paying a “decent respect to the opinions emy. It has been embraced by several of the
of mankind,” the internationalists argue justices who favor using international mate4

While the Declaration’s language may lack gender-inclusiveness, the Court’s phrase lacks a certain exclusiveness. If the world can constitute a community, it is hard to imagine what is not a community. The
galaxy perhaps?
5 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (April , 2005), available at www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg05040.
html.
6 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 43–44
(2004) (“[I]n an interdependent world, United States courts should not decide cases without paying
“a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence. The framers and early Justices understood that the global legitimacy of a ﬂedgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the international system
within which it sought acceptance.”); Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk With You, LEG. AFFAIRS 43 ( July/Aug. 2004) (“Far from being generally hostile to foreign countries’ views or laws, the
founding generation had what the signers of the Declaration of Independence described as a ‘decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind’”.); David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 67 (2002) (referring to “the Jeﬀersonian ideal of paying decent respect
to the opinions of mankind” as a legitimate reason for the U.S. to sign multilateral human rights
treaties).
7 See, e.g. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect To International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM. SOC’Y
INT’ L. PROC. 42, 46–48, nn. 9, 4 (2002) (“From the very beginning of the U.S. Republic, dating
back to the Declaration of Independence, American courts have treated international law as part of
our law and paid decent respect to the opinions of mankind. To reject that history and adopt a
rule of “no deference” to international precedents would be fundamentally antihistorical.”); Harold
Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
085, 087–89 (2002) (“Obeying the law of nations was considered part and parcel of paying decent
respect to the opinions of mankind.”); Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind,
25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 25, 227–28 (992) (emphasis added) (“[T]he authors of the Declaration of Independence thought that it was important and necessary to accord decent respect to the
opinions of mankind. … The conveners of this conference have apparently concluded that we accord
decent respect to the opinions of mankind about our Bill of Rights, and attend to mankind’s criticisms
of it.”).
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rials in constitutional adjudication.⁸
Over a decade ago, Justice Blackmun in
a much-cited article criticized the Court for
failing in its juvenile death penalty rulings “to
inform its decisions with a ‘decent respect to
the opinions of mankind.’”⁹ In Roper itself,
when at oral argument the Missouri state solicitor pointed out that the Founders would
object to the vast power international-style
constitutional interpretation would give the
Court, Justice Ginsburg retorted: “did [ Jeﬀerson in the Declaration] not also say that to …
lead the world, we would have to show a decent respect for the opinions of mankind?”¹⁰
8

9
0


2

3

The function of the “opinions of mankind”
in the internationalist argument is to show
that this approach has the most ancient and
noble domestic pedigree, that the Founding
generation would be sympathetic to what is
now considered an innovative and controversial practice.¹¹ The internationalists do
not wish to admit to possessing what Robert Frost, in writing of the creation of the
post-war international institutions, called
“the courage to be new.”¹² They do not claim,
or wish to be seen as advocating, a major
departure from American legal traditions.¹³
The attempt to legalize and internationalize

See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign
judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent
respect to the opinions of mankind.’”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The
Value Of A Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. S POL’Y REV. 329, 330
(2004):
In the value I place on comparative dialogue – on sharing with and learning from others – I
count myself an originalist in this sense. The 776 Declaration of Independence, you will recall,
expressed concern about the opinions of other peoples; it placed before the world the reasons why
the United States of America … was impelled to separate from Great Britain. The Declaration
did so out of “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”
See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 04 YALE L.J. 39, 45, 48 (994)
(“Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than interpretations of treaties and statutes, should
be informed by a decent respect for the global opinions of mankind.”).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03–633.pdf. Missouri’s counsel meekly accepted Justice Ginsburg’s characterization
of Jeﬀerson’s views. Id. at 8.
Looking to the Declaration to divine the acceptable sources of authority for Article III courts is an inherently problematic endeavor. The Declaration announced the existence of a nation not yet governed
by the Constitution, or even the Articles of Confederation. Nor was it seen by the Founding generation
as a font of constitutional values: it “played almost no part in the debates over the ratiﬁcation of the
Constitution.” GARY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
324 (978). Those who cite it in support of the internationalist argument seem to use it as evidence of
the Founding generation’s general attitude towards world opinion, rather than as shedding light on the
meaning of any particular Constitutional provision or practice.
The phrase is obviously sarcastic. Frost saw the “new” U.N. as merely the latest incarnation of a series
of failed attempts at world peace, such as the League of Nations. ROBERT FROST, “The Courage to
Be New,” in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 387 (969) (originally published in STEEPLE BRUSH
(947)):
Heartbroken and disabled
They will tell you more as soon as
In body and mind,
You tell them what to do
They renew talk of the fabled
With their everbreaking newness
Federation of Mankind. …
And their courage to be new.
See Roper, 25 S. Ct. at 200 (“It does not lessen our ﬁdelity to our Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express aﬃrmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations …
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”).
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humanitarian norms is objectively, and often
unabashedly, a “progressive” development,
which is to say newfangled. Yet the domestic
side of this eﬀort turns to a most conservative
argument – what the Founders thought.¹⁴ One
4

could imagine many proponents of internationalism regarding, for other constitutional
purposes, the attitudes of the Framers as a
matter of ancient history, the Declaration, as
primordial pre-history. Of course there’s not

In another example of this phenomenon, proponents of expanding universal jurisdiction – that is, the
assertion of jurisdiction over an international law violation by a nation with no connection to the
oﬀense – frequently invoke as a precedent the 8th century law of piracy. See Eugene Kontorovich,
The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 95–99,
204–07 (2004). The analogy to piracy seems to acknowledge that under our constitutional system, it
would help to accept what might otherwise appear as a massive expansion of federal judicial power if it
had sanction in practices known to and approved of by the Framers. Id. at 208–09.
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8 G R E E N B A G 2 D 2 61

D i s re s p e c t i n g t h e “O p i n i o n s o f M a n k i n d ”
much wrong with being a born-again originalist, if even for one night – if the originalist
argument stands on its own terms. However,
it will be shown that contrary to the internationalist position, the Declaration was written to shape the opinions of mankind; it did
not contemplate being inﬂuenced by them.¹⁵

I
The invocation of “decent respect” to suggest
that American courts should defer to or even
consider foreign views is in eﬀect a misquotation. Its force depends entirely on lifting

colonists were not following the opinions of
mankind, but merely informing the world
that they had a reasoned position for following their own opinion. Thus “decent respect”
is not about importing foreign opinion but
rather about exporting our views to an interested foreign audience, in the form of a Declaration. In the Founding era, the Justices
were under no illusion that “decent respect”
was about “learning from others,” as Justice
Ginsburg put it; they understood that it was
about informing others.¹⁸
To put it diﬀerently, if the colonists were
to respect the opinions of mankind in the

the words from their context – on ignoring way that Atkins, Lawrence and Roper do,
the second half of the clause from which the there would never have been a revolution.
words are taken.¹⁶ The Declaration in no Indeed, the colonists’ termination of loyalty
way suggests that “decent respect to the opin- to their sovereign monarch was hardly traceions of mankind” requires following those able to anything in the prevailing “opinions
opinions. Rather, all that decent respect “re- of mankind.” It was, if anything, at odds
quires” of us is that we explain our actions with those opinions. At the time, a people’s
to the world – that the colonists “declare the right to govern themselves and to break
causes which impel them to the separation.”¹⁷ with their king to do so were entirely radical
Thus the very same sentence of the Declara- views, unsupported by any state practice and
tion that appeals to the “opinions of man- fundamentally threatening to the existing inkind” also shows the limits of the appeal: the ternational order.¹⁹ While Locke and other
5

6
7
8
9

Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence v. Texas and the Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2
INT’L J. CONST. L. 555, 557 (2004) (emphasis added) (“The ﬁrst paragraph of the Declaration of Independence announced that the colonists’ decision to separate from the United Kingdom was reached in a
process that accorded “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”). Of course the decision to separate
had nothing to do with the opinions of mankind, it was entirely a product of American sentiment.
The inaccuracy of the quotation has been previously noted. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reﬂections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 72 n.7 (2004).
Emphasis added.
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 99, 223 (796) (Chase, J.) (observing that a “decent respect for the
opinions of mankind” made it “proper to give notice of the event to the nations of Europe”).
See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–54,
208–09 (992).
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social contract theorists had laid the philo- of its conduct, but solely with the opinions of
sophical foundation for revolution, it could a few powerful nations about the rebellious
hardly be said that such notions had won colonies’ creditworthiness and perseverance.
the acceptance of the European states. The
The principal purpose of issuing the DecDeclaration’s invocation of “the opinions of laration was to solicit ﬁnancial and military
mankind” in no way suggests that Congress aid from France,²⁰ and hopefully to draw
would change its course if other nations in- her and Spain into the war against Britain.²¹
sisted that it was violating international law. In the spring of 776, many prominent paQuite the opposite: the Declaration closes triots still hoped that reconciliation with
by saying that nothing will stay the new na- the crown would be possible, and measures
tion from its chosen course. Later, the views short of total independence might suﬃce.
articulated in the Declaration would ﬁnd a Congress understood that France and Spain
receptive audience in France, and, eventually, would not mount operations to assist the
much of the rest of the world. But this could colonists if they thought the wavering rebonly happen because the Founding genera- els would quickly reconcile themselves with
tion believed in the superiority of their no- Britain after taking a licking in the coming
tion of government, and would not accede to summer campaign.²² The colonists would
the dominant monarchial conception.
need to borrow money, but this would hardly be forthcoming if France and Spain didn’t
expect Congress to be around to repay. Thus
II
the ensuing list of grievances is meant not so
To understand what “the opinions of man- much to convince the Europeans of the juskind” meant to the Founding generation, tice of the Americans’ cause, as to convince
one must consider why they appealed to them that Americans deeply believe in the
them. The Declaration was solely intended justice of their own cause, and harbor a deep
to aﬀect foreign opinion – but not in a way sense of injury that will prevent reconciliathat supports the internationalist argument. tion.²³ This is the import of the Declaration’s
For just as the internationalists take the stirring ﬁnal words: we are wholly commit“opinions of mankind” phrase out of its tex- ted – in “our lives, our fortunes, and our satual context, they entirely ignore its historical cred honor” – to the ﬁght.
context. Looking at that context shows that
To be sure, Congress also hoped the Decthe Founding generation was not concerned laration would yield what might be thought
with international opinion about the legality of as “international law” beneﬁts, in particular,
20

See WILLS at 325 (“About the motive for declaring independence there can be no doubt … it was a
necessary step for securing foreign aid in the ongoing war eﬀort.”).
2 In Congress, the Declaration was raised as a “measure[ ] … for procuring the assistance of foreign
powers,” see THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3, in WRITINGS (984), and the timing was
partially motivated by the desire to have France’s help in the diﬃcult summer campaign.
22 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 763–89 at 82 (3rd ed. 992) (“The Declaration of Independence itself was issued mainly for the purpose of assuring potential allies that the
Americans were playing for keeps and would not ﬂy into the mother country’s arms at the ﬁrst sign of
parental indulgence.”).
23 See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE. See also JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (985) (“The Declaration was largely a foreign policy statement; without
it America could hardly appeal for foreign assistance against the great army gathering to attack New
York.”).
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the advantages that accompany state recognition: the opening of foreign trade and the
establishment of diplomatic relations, which
would facilitate the making of defense and
commercial treaties.²⁴ As Jeﬀerson wrote, “a
declaration of Independence would render it
consistent with European delicacy for European powers to treat with us.”²⁵ International
lawyers often point to state recognition as an
area where international law is particularly
robust: without the international norms of
recognition, “states” would not exist at all.
However, the proponents of the Declaration
saw its importance in practical, geopolitical, rather than legalistic, terms. As Thomas
Paine argued in Common Sense, it would
be “unreasonable to suppose that France or
Spain would oﬀer us any kind of assistance
if we mean only to make use of that assistance” to remain in the Empire but on more
favorable terms. And the Founders, keen as
they were on opening trade with France, rejected the “constructivist” view of statehood.
While nodding to “European delicacy,” they
did not believe that America’s existence as a
nation turned on the legalism of recognition.
As the supporters of the Declaration put it
in Congress, “the question was not whether,
by a declaration of independence we should
make ourselves what we are not; but whether
we should declare a fact that already exists.”²⁶
In today’s international law, “the community of nations” means more or less that. The
practice of South Africa or Russia is as relevant as that of El Salvador or Tuvalu. The
appeal is truly to the general view of governments around the world. Yet the “Mankind”
to which the Declaration speaks is hardly
24
25
26
27

this ecumenical. It is narrower than the set
of civilized nations; narrower even than Europe. The Declaration’s “Mankind” is: France,
Spain, and perhaps Holland – likely and potential players in the nation’s struggle to be
born.²⁷ The opinions of, say, Russia, would
hardly matter; not because the authors had
a crabbed view of the international community or the legitimate participants in international law-making, but because the men to
whose opinions the authors appealed were
those who could act, through arms or money,
to the ﬂedgling nation’s beneﬁt or prejudice.
Nonetheless, one can learn from the Declaration about the Founders’ views on the
relevance of international opinion. International legal approval itself counts for nothing;
all that counts is the opinions of a few states
with the power and political inclination
to help. To the extent the opinion of those
states counts, it is only if their favorable impression would lead them to confer speciﬁc
military and trade advantages on America.
Foreign approval in the moral or sentimental
sense counts for nothing, nor do their views
of our purely internal arrangements: no one
expected Spain to be enamored of the concepts of rebellion, popular sovereignty, and
republicanism.
To apply this worldview to current debates, European opinions on the juvenile
death penalty should only be considered if,
say, France or Spain would send a division to
Iraq if we satisﬁed their “European delicacy.”
Of course, France would never send such a
division (if it had one to spare), and Spain
has already withdrawn its troops, and is unlikely to send them back in consideration for

See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30–3 (957).
See JEFFERSON at 6.
Id. at 5. See also Ware, 3 U.S. at 223.
In Jeﬀerson’s notes of the debates on the Declaration, France and Spain, the only nations poised to ﬁght
Britain, are the only countries mentioned. In the surrounding discussions, Holland is also mentioned
as an attractive trading partner once independence is established.
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Roper. In this light, Justice Ginsburg’s use of
the Declaration to support a reliance on “foreign judicial views” is particularly inappropriate; foreign judges may be able to invite
American ones to deliver lectures, but they
cannot bestow the more signiﬁcant beneﬁts
of arms in wartime.

III
Most of those who invoke the Declaration
in support of the internationalist approach
would not go so far as to say that ﬁdelity to
the Founders’ views requires adherence to foreign law. Why then quibble about their use
of the phrase? Firstly, atextual and ahistoric
quotation makes for bad legal arguments,
and thus bad law. If there is an argument to
be made for relying on foreign law in constitutional interpretation, it must be made on
its own terms, not with those swiped from
the Founders. Second, a decent respect for
our founding documents requires that we

28

268

not lose sight of their meaning through repeated mischaracterization, however casual.
One might worry that scholars and judges who play fast-and-loose with our own revered founding documents will not ﬁght fair
with the massive arsenal of foreign law with
which they seek to arm themselves. One of
the biggest problems with using international
and foreign legal materials is their malleability. There is much to choose from, so judges
may point to those parts of foreign law that
support their argument, while leaving out
those that do not²⁸ – a selectivity akin to lifting a quote from its textual context. Actual
foreign legal practices are often hard to identify; practice may diﬀer dramatically from
laws in the books and thus a sensitivity to
context is crucial. The lack of decent respect
for the Declaration, which lawyers and judges may be presumed to know well, makes
one wonder how carefully an internationalist
judge would parse international conventions,
to say nothing of the laws of China.

See Roper, 25 S. Ct. at 223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll the Court has done today … is to look over
the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.”).
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